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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In modern warfare, air defense against high performance
aircraft is vital. In general, air defense is a highly
variable process. Unpredictable factors such as weather,
terrain, aircraft performance, tactics, system performance,
and operator performance greatly affect the outcome. Air
defense modeling, in large-scale combat models, has encoun-
tered problems dealing with this high variability. The
current modeling has concentrated on analyzing air defense
effectiveness by aggregating many factors. Two large combat
models, CORDIVEM and VECTOR-2, have used aggregate air
defense models in an attempt to evaluate the effect of air
defense on overflight aircraft. The designers have tried to
represent warfare in a realistic, accurate manner. However,
they have ignored factors such as command and control,
terrain, and enemy electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Accounting for these factors usually requires an increase in
model resolution which has been considered unacceptable.
Command and control issues have been resolved by
assuming that firing units act autonomously. Terrain effects
have been ignored because most terrain models require many
computations and large data bases. EW capabilities have been
disregarded because their effects on air defense radars are
involved and require extremely high resolution modeling to
yield reliable results. In general, the air defense models




When an air defense model disregards the factors of
command and control, terrain, and EW, the predictions
concerning enemy aircraft attrition rates can be seriously
overestimated.
For example, today's high performance aircraft are
capable of flying low altitude, long range approaches which
make maximum use of terrain masking. Such tactics greatly
decrease the aircraft's vulnerability to ground air defense
and enhance survivability. Moreover, it may be possible for
some aircraft to completely avoid radar detection. Current
aggregate air defense models encounter difficulty analyzing
such situations. Developing models which consider command
and control, terrain, and EW effects obviously requires more
resolution and model complexity.
Can improvements be made which address the above shortcom-
ings without making these large-scale models overly cumber-
some and unresponsive ?
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are to :
1. Analyze the air defense overflight models used in
CORDIVEM and VECTOR- 2.
2. Develop an improved approach to air defense overflight
modeling which will serve as a design framework for
future model building.
Chapter 2 contains a description and critique of the air
defense model used in VECTOR-2. Chapter 3 contains a
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similar analysis for CORDIVEM. Chapter 4 summarizes the
major deficiencies found in the analyses. Finally, Chapter
5 presents a generalized approach which addresses the short-
comings of the Vector-2 and CORDIVEM models. The intent of
this thesis is not to develop a detailed computer program
which will model air defense against overflights. Instead we
are developing a program design which can be used to improve




II. VECTOR- 2 MODEL ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The VECTOR-2 model was developed in 1976 by The Vector
Research Corporation. It represents deterministic ground
and air theater combat among several kinds of units.
There are three kinds of combat involving aircraft: air
to air combat between penetrating attackers and intercep-
tors, ground-to-air attrition against overflying aircraft,
and combat in the target area. We will focus on the ground-
to-air attrition of aircraft during overflight of the air
defense sites
.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE AIR DEFENSE MODEL IN VECTOR-2
1 . Overview of the Air Combat Model
In VECTOR-2, aircraft, attacking the same ground
target or intercepting the same aircraft, can be placed in
the same air group for the duration of the mission. The
models of movement and attrition treat all members of an air
group' as flying together in proximity during the mission.
Different air groups fly their missions independently. All
air groups marked as "massed" fly together during their
missions. During the mission the air group can engage in
combat in up to three ways:
A. It can be attrited by overflown enemy air defense
weapons at any time during its mission .
B. It can be attrited by air defense fires from air defense
sites in the vicinity of the ground target while it is
13
attacking the target.
C. It can be attrited by interceptors at any time during
its flight.
The air combat models pass losses to air groups as
they occur during the mission. There are several
constraints on these attrition processes. For example,
interceptors are assumed never to be exposed to fires from
air defense sites and never to be intercepted themselves.
An air group follows one of three types of flight paths:
straight line, two line segments, or a mass-attack path.
The two line segment path consists of a straight line from
the base to a turning point, directly across the Forward
Edge of Battle Area (FEBA) , and a straight line from the
turning point to the target. The turning point is on a
line perpendicular to the FEBA passing through the target.
It is located a certain safe distance behind the FEBA,
assumed to be the minimum distance at which the air group is
safe from enemy air defense fires. The turning point is
chosen in this way to minimize the time during which the
attackers overfly enemy air defenses. Figure 2.1 illus-
trates an attack flight path.
When attack aircraft are massed, one or more air
groups fly from their bases to a turning point on their side
of the FEBA. There, they turn and fly straight into a
massing point on the enemy's side of the FEBA. From the
massing point, every air group flies in a straight line to
its target, conducts the attack, and flies straight out to
its own territory in a path perpendicular to the FEBA. Once
it has reached a safe distance behind the FEBA, the air
group turns, and flies in a straight line back to its








Figure 2.1 Attack Flight Path.
2. Overview of the Ground- to-Air Attrition Model of
Overflights
When a penetrating flight comes within range of an
air defense site, the air defense weapons at that site have
an opportunity to engage the aircraft in the flight. An air
15
Figure 2.2 Mass Attack Flight Paths.
defense weapon will fire at the aircraft, if all the
following conditions hold:
a. A weapon at the site acquires at least one of the
aircraft
.
b. Ordinance is available for the air defense weapon.
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c. The air defense weapon is not occupied engaging other
aircraft. Aircraft attacking the site or a ground target
in the region of the site are higher priority targets
for the air defense weapon than are overflying aircraft.
d. The air defense weapon is in an ADA resource group.
ADA weapons in non-ADA resource groups do not fire at
over-flying aircraft. Instead, they fire at aircraft
attacking the target they are defending.
e. The aircraft are not within an intercept corridor, i.e.,
a region in which interceptors operate and in which air
defense weapons are not allowed to fire. If intercept
corridors are in effect, air defense weapons may engage
aircraft only behind a line located a safe distance
behind the FEBA. Forward of this line the air defense
function is given exclusively to interceptors.
The lateral boundaries of the air defense side's front-
line zones consist of straight lines projected
perpendicular to the FEBA ( see Figure 2.3 ).
The total losses suffered by an overflying group of
aircraft in a time step are the sum of the losses from all
fires directed at the group in that interval. The losses
caused by a single ADA weapon in that interval, given that
the aircraft are within range of the site during the
interval, are the product of the rate of fire from the site,
the single shot kill probability, and the length of the
interval. The firing rate and the kill probability depend
on the type of the ADA weapon. The kill probability also
depends on the aircraft type.
This attrition model in VECTOR-2 is applied at the
start of every time step to compute attrition against air















Figure 2.3 Intercept and Air Defense Corridors.
The kill rate computation is based on the following
assumptions :
a. The kill rate against aircraft in a particular group is
the sum of the kill rates from the air defenses of all
different zones.
b. The kill rate against a particular type of aircraft in a
group is determined using the assumption that the rounds
fired against the group have equal probability of being
fired against any aircraft in the group.
The losses to type k aircraft in air group L during an
interval of length A t are:
18
n = /.— x ma At
kL ij ijkL
where
n : the number of aircraft
.
m : the number of ADA weapons.
m : the number of air defense sites of type i in
ij
zone j that are not suppressed, are not allocated to fire at
aircraft attacking the site or targets around it, and have
ammunition available.
a : the average rate at which such a type i ADA site
ijkL
in zone j is killing type k aircraft of air group L during
this time step.
3. The Kill Rate
The kill rate is the average rate at which aircraft
are attrited during the entire mission. It is the total
expected ADA attrition of the group , divided by the duration
of that part of the mission when the group is vulnerable to
ADA fire. Thus, the attrition of the group is "smoothed"
over the vulnerable period and is not necessarily assessed
in the actual amounts received at the time the attrition
occurs. This averaging of the kill rate avoids the repeti-
tion of many costly calculations in each time step.
The rest of this subsection is concerned with computing the
kill rate.
The kill rate for a type i ADA in zone j versus type k
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The factors of this equation are defined below.
f : the fraction of type i ADA sites in zone j which
ijL
are within range of air group L for some part of its
mission. It is determined from the flight path and altitude
of the air group and by the range of this type of ADA site.
b : the average fraction of time, while an air group
iL
is in range of an ADA site, that it is acquired and can be
engaged by the site.
r : the average firing rate of a type i ADA site
i
against overflight aircraft, given that it is engaging
overflying aircraft.
q : the probability of kill per unit of fire for
ik
type i ADA site engaging type k aircraft on overflight.
e : the proportion of the fire which a type i ADA
ij
site in zone j actually achieves against the group, consid-
ering the current saturation of the site by multiple
flights. Thus, given that an air group is an eligible
target, this is the probability that the ADA site is not
engaging some other target.
c : the probability that any given ADA site is
JLi
allocated to fire at air group L, given that the air group
is currently eligible to be fired at by the site. This
factor reflects assumed restrictions in ADA fire, whereby an
average of one site may fire per every two aircraft in the
group
.
E : the fraction of the vulnerable period in which
iL
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the air group is within range of a given ADA site, given
that it passes within range of the ADA site during some time
vulnerable period of its mission.
n
kL
. ^he ratio of the number of aircraft of
n
xL type k to the total number of aircraft. It
x
appears as a factor to allocate fire with equal probability




The factor e was interpreted as the probability
that a type i ADA site in zone j is engaging an air group,
given that the air group is in range and available as a
target. This is just the reciprocal of the mean number of
air groups available as targets, given that at least one is







The numerator is the probability of at least one air group
being available, and the denominator is the unconditional
mean number of air groups available at one time. The prob-
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where the product extends over all air groups, and where
t : the integration period ; i . e
.
, the duration of the
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period during which the model will assess attrition against
air group L .
T : the duration of the mission of group L, from take-
La
off to landing.
The duration of the mission is estimated from the
known length of the flight path, the known air group speed,
and the assumption that an input maximum number of passes
will be made over the target. The integration period
approximates the vulnerable period of the air group, but
accounts for the fact that an integer number of time steps
will be taken by Vector-2 to assess the attrition in the
vulnerable period.
The mean number of air groups available at one time,
as targets to a single type i ADA site in zone j , is
where
S : the minimum of M , the mean time spent within
iL iL
range of an ADA site of type i, and the vulnerable period of
group L.
The mean time in range of a type i ADA site is obtained by
approximating the region around an ADA site in which the
site can engage aircraft by a rectangular area. The lateral
range (along the earth's surface) of a type i ADA site
against air group L is
2 2 1/2
L = ( R - A )
iL i L
22
if R > A , where
i L
R : the slant range of a type i ADA site .
i
A : the altitude of air group L.
The region around the site where air group L could
be engaged is approximated by a rectangle of width 2L and
JL
depth L /2 ,so that the area around the site is preserved
JL
to be that of a circle of radius L
iL
It is assumed that ADA sites are located no closer
to the FEBA than a line a distance L /2 behind and parallel
iL
to the FEBA. Denote the length of the flight path from this
line to the target of group L by the symbol P
iL
Let r denote the average speed of the air group.
Three cases can hold, as defined below.
If P > L /4 , then
iL iL
7C L 7IL /4
iL iL
M = ( i _
iL r P + L /4
iL iL
If -ItL /4 < P -/4 , then
iL iL
M = (P + TlL /4)/r .
iL iL iL





5 . The Coordination Factor
The factor C is the probability that any given ADA
site is allocated to fire at an aircraft in group L, given
that the air group is currently eligible to be engaged by
the site. The specific form of this factor used in VECTOR-2
was derived from an assumption that no more than one site on
the average may fire at every two aircraft in the group.
Two physical situations are of particular interest
as alternative interpretations of this assumption. First, is
the situation in which air defense sites are assigned non-
overlapping regions of air space. then, a site can engage
only aircraft inside its own assigned region. These regions
need not cover the entire air space. But, as long as
aircraft travel in pairs, each pair of aircraft can be in
the region of no more than one ADA site at a time. Second,
is the situation in which ADA sites are not assigned phys-
ical regions of responsibility, but in which their fire is
coordinated by a central facility. This facility allocates
targets to specific sites. The coordination factor reflects
a case in which the allocation controllers assign an average
of no more than one site to every two aircraft.
The coordination factor is computed as the ratio of
(1) the maximum number of weapon- seconds of fire that could
be directed at the group during its mission, if fire is
restricted to one site per pair of aircraft, to (2) the
number of weapon-seconds of fire that could be directed at
the group if no such restriction exists.
Thus, the factor is
5 T' > n
L ^~ kL
k
L V" t' J~ f mj£
— iL c— ijL ij
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where
T' : the duration of the vulnerable period for air group
Li
L; i.e. , the length of time that the group is over enemy
territory or within ADA range of enemy territory.
t : the mean time that group L spends within range of a
iL
type i ADA site, given that it comes within range of the
site at some time in the vulnerable period.
6 . The Exposure Factor
The factor E is the fraction of the integration
iL
period in which the air group is within range of a given ADA
site, given that it passes within range of the site at some






where the numerator and denominator have both been defined
previously
.
C. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES OF THE VECTOR-2 AIR DEFENSE MODEL
The VECTOR-2 model contains several . deficiencies which
raise doubt about the accuracy of predicted aircraft attri-
tion rates. These deficiencies are documented in this
section.
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1) The model does not consider the earth curvature effect.
Consider the case of a typical flight, as in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 VECTOR-2 Lateral Range Calculation,
The VECTOR-2 model defines the lateral detection range
(distance along the earth's surface J as the length of the
curve segment OB. The algorithm computes an approximation
for lateral range, L, as follows:
26
,2 2 1/2
L & ( R - a )
Where R = Maximum range of the ADA acquisition radar.
a = Altitude of the aircraft.
This approximation is poor for low altitude aircraft flying
below the radar horizon. Figure 2.5 shows an example of a
low flying aircraft.










Figure 2.5 The Flight Paths Considering Earth Curvature
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An improved approximation for lateral range can be derived
in the following manner.
Let X = The slant range of the target at detection.
Re = Radius of the earth.
2 2 1/2 2 1/2
Then X = ( (Re+a.) - Re ) = (a + 2aRe)
for X £ R
_
2 2 1/2
Since L ~ ( X - a )
1/2
then L ^ ( 2aRe )
TABLE I
A COMPARISON OF LATERAL RANGE APPROXIMATIONS
CONSIDERING EARTH CURVATURE















| 500 1 27.52 1 60.00 1 27.52 |
As an example, compare the approximations of lateral
range for different altitudes. Assume the value of R equals
60 miles.
For an aircraft flying at 1000 feet above the surface of
the ADA site, the lateral range was overestimated by more
than 20 miles. This overestimation can greatly overstate the
detection capability of the site.
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2) The model does not consider the effect of terrain.
This model does not consider the effect of terrain
masking. Yet, terrain can be the most significant factor
affecting the acquisition and engagement of an aircraft.
For example, consider the terrain profile shown in Figure
2.6.
Figure 2.6 Typical Terrain.
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The distance between the ADA site and the obstacle, 1, is 15
miles. The height, h, is 500 feet. If an aircraft is
approaching the site at an altitude, a, of 500 feet, the
true lateral range of the aircraft, L2 , is 15 miles. Table
II compares the lateral range approximations without terrain
masking, where
L = lateral range computed in VECTOR-2
LI = lateral range computed considering earth
curvature correction.
TABLE II
A COMPARISON OF LATERAL RANGE APPROXIMATIONS
CONSIDERING TERRAIN
a (feet) | L (miles) | LI (miles) | L2 (miles)
500 | 60.66 | 27.52 | 15.66
From the above comparison, it is clear that lateral
range calculations can be easily overestimated when terrain
effects are ignored.
3) The model does not consider the case of overlapping
coverage
.
The VECTOR-2 model assumes that no more than one site,
on the average, may fire for every two aircraft in the
group. This assumption is reasonable in two different situ-
ations. The first situation occurs when air defense sites
are assigned non-overlapping regions of air space. The
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second situation occurs when the fire of ADA sites is coor-
dinated by a central facility that allocates a target to a
specific firing unit. However, ADA site coverages are often
overlapped. Furthermore, it is very difficult to coordinate
the fires of ADA sites under battle conditions when communi-
cation may be degraded. Therefore, if the ADA sites are
positioned so that overlapping coverage exists, the model
will overestimate the attrition of aircraft.
4) The model does not consider enemy electronic warfare (EW)
capability
.
There should be time delays inserted in the acquisition
and tracking models to simulate the effectiveness of enemy
EW against the air defense system. These time delays can be
modelled as random variables which are dependent on the type
and number of EW systems acting against the ADA sites in
question.
5) The model does not allow sites to exercise target priori-
tization and selection.
A primary model assumption is that a site will
distribute fires uniformly over all targets which are within
radar coverage. This violates basic air defense doctrine.
Sites should fire at targets inbound to the defended area
before firing at targets which are returning to their side
of the FEBA.
6) The model assumes that a given site uses a constant rate
of fire.
31
The rate of fire of an air defense weapon is strongly-
dependent on the continuity of the acquisition and tracking
process. If terrain effects are ignored and the lateral
range of acquisition is merely a function of flight alti-
tude, the firing rate can be grossly overestimated.
7) The model does not allow for fratricide.
In most air defense scenarios, fratricide is reality
which cannot be avoided. There should be some consideration
given to the loss of time and weapon allocation resources
which result when a site fires on friendly aircraft.
8) The aircraft movement algorithm is highly restrictive.
The description of aircraft movement in VECTOR-2 indi-
cates that all the aircraft in a flight pass through site
radar coverage envelopes at constant altitude and speed.
Such tactics would rarely be employed by overflying aircraft
as they approach their intended targets. The enemy aircraft
approaches should allow for more realistic routes.
9) The input variables used to calculate the kill rate
represent average system/operator performance characteris-
tics. Terrain effects, command and control policies, and
enemy electronic warfare capabilities have not been explic-
itly considered in determining these averages. The kill
rate is computed by multiplying these variables.
Specifically, the kill rate formula is of the form
a = f v" b * r * q *




f : the fraction of type i ADA site in zone j whichiiL
are within range of air group L for some part of its
mission.
b : the average fraction of time, while an air
iL
group is in range of an ADA site, that it is acquired and
can be engaged by the site.
r : the average firing rate of a type i ADA site
i
against overflight aircraft, given that it is engaging
overflying aircraft
.
q : the probability of kill per unit of fire for
ik
type i ADA site engaging type k aircraft on overflight.
The kill rate is the dominant factor in computing
aircraft attrition. It is strongly influenced by the multi-
plication of the above four variables which are derived from
aggregate methodology. Therefore, the kill rate can have a
large variation when there are small errors in each factor.
In particular, a 5% error in each factor results in approxi-
mately a 20% error in the overall kill rate prediction.
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III. CORDIVEM MODEL ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The air defense model used in CORDIVEM has many of the
same aggregate features of VECTOR-2. This chapter will
describe the main features of the overflight model and
summarize major deficiencies existing in the model design.
High resolution techniques were employed to develop
aggregate factors as inputs to the CORDIVEM air defense
model. In particular, a model run by the Army Material
Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) was used to generate vari-
ables such as average acquisition range and probability of
kill. The model, known as INCURSION, is a one-on-one air
defense simulation which has been employed for several
years. This method of providing aggregate model inputs is
superior to that of VECTOR-2. However, there is still a
considerable loss of realism. In general, the problems of
aggregation still exist.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE AIR DEFENSE MODEL IN CORDIVEM
1. Fraction of Engagement ( FRACEN )
In the air defense submodel of CORDIVEM, the primary
values of interest appear to be average engagement range,
probability of kill, and average number of rounds expended.
The quantity of average engagement range seems especially
important, since it is the value used throughout the air
defense submodel to determine if an engagement is possible.
This variable is an output of the ADAGE INCURSION model
which produces the results of a one-on-one duel between an
air defense system and a single aircraft. In ADAGE
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INCURSION, two types of flight paths are considered: a
straight line ingress / egress and an attack pattern in the
target vicinity.
Since ADAGE INCURSION is a stochastic simulation, a
large number of trials must be performed to obtain statisti-
cally significant results. Each trial varies the lateral
offset of the flight with respect to the air defense system,
as well as providing different random draws which affect
probabilistic system functions. After the completion of the
requisite number of trials, summary statistics can be
compiled for the flight path.
The calculation of FRACEN depends on a flight path.
For ingress / egress flight paths,
Distance That The Flight is in Acquisition
FRACEN =
2 " Average Engagement Range
From this equation, the FRACEN can equal 1 only if
the flight flies directly over the air defense system. But
the average engagement has that flight path as being a
special case with offset being equal to zero. For an
in- target-vicinity flight path,
FRACEN =
Pass Number
This causes a counter- intuitive result. As more
passes are made on a target, the air defense becomes less
and less effective. For each trial of an attack pass, only
one pass should be modeled. There are no multiple passes
allowed. Since the engagement results match up the single
run shown in INCURSION, each pass should have FRACEN = 1.
But under the assumption that the entire attack pass is
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constrained in the airspace over the single hex, this
formula is applied.
2. Time for Engagement ( RMINTIM )
This algorithm is used to check on the passage of
inter- engagement time. Before an AD unit is allowed to
engage a flight, some amount of time must pass since the
previous engagement of this ADA unit.
RMINTIM = Time Between Engagement * FRACEN
Here, the time between engagements is a function of
the air defense system itself. The major assumption here is
that the time between engagements will degrade linearly with
FRACEN. This assumption obviously does not hold at values
of FRACEN close to zero, since there must be some minimum
time needed for an engagement process.
3. Maximum Number of Firers ( RMAXF )
Number of AD Weapons in Unit
RMAXF =
Number of AD Weapons Engaging Flight
It is assumed that AD firings are uniformly distrib-
uted over the flight to be engaged. The concept of prioriti-
zation is ignored. Also, factors such as perceived threat to
the fire unit or defended asset and battlefield geometry are
not considered.
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4. Number of ADA Systems Available for Firing ( RNADA )
The availability of ADA system during an engagement
can be expressed as:
RNADA = Maximum number of Firers (RMAXF)
* Probability of Participation (ROBP)
* Fraction of an Engagement (FRACEN)
* Percent of unit's coverage area covered
by one Weapon (RPERCOV)
The probability of participation is the result of a
look-up table, based upon the function of the AD weapon, the
aircraft type, and the participation index. This table is
taken from ADAGE CAMPAIGN and represents the level of
participation one could expect from an aggregated AD unit.




Here, the system coverage is represented by a circle
of radius equal to the average engagement range. It is
assumed that the number of units available for an engage-
ment will be based on the ratio of coverage areas without
consideration of engagement geometry.
5. Number of Weapons Needed ( RNADN )
The algorithm is
Number of Aircraft in Flight/ Pka
RNADN =
Number of Simultaneous Engagements per Weapon
This term could be considered as a fire control
measure since it determines the minimum number of AD systems
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required to completely destroy the flight using an A-kill
criteria. An A-kill is damage inflicted on an aircraft
which causes its destruction within a five minute period.
The term in the denominator indicates a preference for
simultaneous engagements by a single weapon in lieu of
multiple engagements by various weapons. Most fire control
systems would favor utilizing as many assets as possible
before resorting to extended simultaneous engagements.
6. Number of Fully Supplied Weapons ( RNADSS )
Rounds left in Unit
RNADSS =
(Number of Simultaneous Engagements / Weapon )
* ( Rounds / Engagement )
Supply considerations are of greatest import for
this algorithm. The level of aggregation in CORDIVEM
precludes consideration of weapons firing with less than the
average number of rounds required.
7. Number of Aircraft Affected by AD ( RNACN )
RNACN = Number of Weapons Firing
* Number of Simultaneous Engagement / Weapon
After the number of weapons to fire in this engage-
ment has been determined, subroutine ACDIE can calculate the
number of aircraft that will be affected by the air defense.
This algorithm again assumes no shared targets among the AD
weapons taking part in the engagement
.
8. Number of Aircraft Surviving Kill ( RNACSK , RNACSKA )
This algorithm provides two different formulas depending
upon the type of AD system involved in the engagement.
First, for HIMAD weapon systems
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RNACSK = Number of A/C in Flight
- Pk * Number of A/C Engaged.
For this formula, two assumptions are important:
a. Only one HIMAD weapon per site fires at a given, flight.
For a large flight, this would probably not hold but it
is acceptable for the present play of two to four
aircraft per flight.
b. The number of simultaneous engagements per weapon will
not exceed the number of aircraft in the flight. It means
that the HIMAD weapon will only fire one missile at each
aircraft in the flight per engagement. So no multiple
engagements of the same aircraft will take place.
There is also no accounting for shared kills by multiple AD
units against the same flight.
For SHORAD weapon systems
RNACSK = Number of A/C in Flight
- Pk - Number of A/C Engaged
Both of these formulas ignore the problem of shared
kills. It is possible for one aircraft to be engaged by
more than one firing unit. As a result, these algorithms
overestimate attrition rates.
C. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES OF THE CORDIVEM AIR DEFENSE MODEL.
1. In this model, the kill rate is also formed by multi-
plying several factors. As a result, it is very sensitive to
small errors in input variables.
2. This model does not allow for degradation of detection
capability because of terrain and earth curvature effects.
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3. In the algorithm which computes FRACEN for an in-target-
vicinity flight path, FRACEN is the reciprocal of pass
number. This implies that as more passes are made on a
target, the air defense becomes less effective. If there are
no multiple passes allowed, only one pass would be modeled
and each pass should have FRACEN = 1. As such, the formula
is meaningless in the one pass algorithm. In reality, FRACEN
would probably increase on subsequent attack passes due to
the lessened detection and reaction times for the air
defense system. Additional ADAGE runs could explore this
possibility and develop a factor to be applied to all attack
passes after the initial one.
4. In maximum number of firers ( RMAXF ), The concept of
prioritization is ignored. There is no greater emphasis on
four helicopters firing ATGM than two penetrators egressing
over their area. Presently this algorithm would allocate ADA
units equally to each threat.
5. In number of AD systems available for firing ( RNADA ),
the availability of AD systems during an engagement is a
function of four terms: the maximum number of firers
(RMAXF), probability of participation (ROBP), fraction of
engagement (FRACEN), and percent of unit's coverage area
covered by one weapon (RPERCOV) . The number of units avail-
able for engagement is based on the ratio of coverage areas
without consideration of engagement geometry. However, geom-
etry affects this algorithm much more than any of the terms
mentioned.
6. In number of weapons needed (RNADN) , it is unlikely
that any fire control system would consider total attrition
of a flight with an unlimited number of AD systems.
Furthermore, this algorithm does not consider shared kills
between AD systems. The possibility of multiple kills should
be modeled.
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7. There is presently no structure in the air defense
submodel to portray command and control issues. Weapons
control status manipulation and fire distribution can be
major determinants in the conduct of an air defense battle.
Furthermore, this model does not consider overlapping
coverage by two or more ADA sites. In order to optimize the
use of air defense assets, CORDIVEM should include fire
control and account for overlapping coverage.
8. Fratricide can not take place in this air defense
model. Some means of portraying fratricide for the air
space management measures should be included in this
submodel
.
9. The effects of enemy aircraft ECM on radar capabilities
should be played explicitly in this submodel. The effects
of jamming, terrain-following flight paths, and other coun-
termeasures could be modeled through manipulation of the
minimum engagement time and the attrition rate.
10. Air defense units must be allowed to prioritize their
fires when faced with multiple targets. The model does not
allow for prioritization and logical target selection by
each site.
11. The model does not allow for overkill. Overkill
should be acceptable against a target identified as threat-
ening a critical asset.
12. The determining factor in the calculation of FRACEN in
subroutine ACDIE should be time rather than distance. A
more realistic method of attrition can then be based on time
in coverage rather than distance in coverage.
13. An air defense weapon can have either an optical mode
or a radar mode in this submodel. Therefore, it is necessary
to consider the systems as having two acquisition modes.
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14. Smoke must be considered for units which depend upon
optical means of acquisition in this submodel because it can
have an effect upon both the acquisition and weapon perform-
ance portions of an engagement.
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IV. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The review, of the air defense models contained in
VECTOR- 2 and CORDIVEM has demonstrated that aggregate
modeling of air defense engagements has several shortcom-
ings. These shortcomings are summarized below.
A. ENGAGEMENT GEOMETRY
Terrain and earth curvature effects have been generally
ignored. It is possible that low flying aircraft could spend
minimal time in air defense coverage envelopes and have a
very high probability of survival.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control is not modeled in any manner. If the
air defense units are operating in a centralized mode, fire
distribution may be very efficient. However, it will also be
very time consuming. The net result of this type of control
cannot be easily examined using aggregate modeling. If the
air defense units are operating in a decentralized or auton-
omous mode, time delays will lessen. However, shared kills
will increase and the attrition rate may be overestimated.
C. ELECTRONIC WARFARE
There is no allowance for degraded system/operator
performance when enemy aircraft have electronic counter-
measures (ECM) available. A mediocre air defense crew can be
rendered ineffective in a hostile electronic environment.
The model user should have the option to input enemy ECM
capability into the air defense battle.
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D. TARGET PRIORITIZATION AND SELECTION
Individual firing units rarely distribute fires
uniformly over the threat. Air defense models should provide
for fire unit prioritization and selection. There should
also be provisions for the time delays which may occur in
order to accomplish these tasks.
E. INTERMITTENT SYSTEM/ OPERATOR FAILURES
The engagement sequence of detection, acquisition,
track, fire, and damage assessment must be modeled in the
light of highly variable levels of performance. Both air
defense systems and operators will not repeatedly perform at
the same degree of proficiency. Such variabilities should
be incorporated to make the attrition analysis credible.
F. FRATRICIDE
The engagement process should allow for the uncertain-
ties and time delays which will occur when a firing unit is
required to identify targets as friend or foe (IFF). It is
unrealistic to assume that fratricide will not occur or that
IFF procedures are carried out without time delays.
The following chapter will present the design of a
modeling approach which addresses the above shortcomings.
This model will more accurately portray the air defense
process and prevent the user from inputting model parameters
which are heavily biased or inadvertently misleading.
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V. GENERAL APPROACH TO MODELING AIR DEFENSE AGAINST
OVERFLIGHT
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present an air defense
simulation design which will eliminate many of the modeling
deficiencies documented in the preceding chapters . The
proposed approach will make use of higher resolution tech-
niques. However, many of the calculations and submodels can
be implemented in an off-line mode. In most cases, these
subprograms can be executed in a pre-processing stage and
will have negligible effect on the execution of the main
simulation.
An overview of the air defense engagement sequence will
be presented. This sequence will provide the framework used
to develop the simulation design. This design is -intended to
provide an architecture for the model builder. Emphasis
will be placed on modeling terrain, ECM, command and
control, and system/operator performance. Details on the
submodels accessed by the main program are developed in the
appendices following Chapter VI.
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions which the model design has used are:
1. Aircraft flight paths can be modeled as series of
connected line segments.
2. Enemy aircraft will employ terrain masking as tactics
dictate
.
3. Enemy aircraft may employ ECM' to enhance their prob-
ability of survival.
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4. Air defense sites will operate in both centralized
and autonomous modes of control.
5. Air defense sites will be located as tactics dictate.
The locations will allow for overlapping coverage to
defend high priority targets.
6. Each air defense site has some maximum number of
targets which it can engage.
7. There will be a one-to-one correspondence between
active tracking radars and targets which are being
tracked.
8. Each air defense site will follow a designated target
prioritization and selection algorithm.
9. Fratricide can occur. If IFF checks are used, prob-
abilities of erroneous target classification will be
assigned
.
10. Intermittent system/operator failures will be
allowed.
11. Inclement weather conditions will degrade system
performance
.
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE
An air defense site follows a well defined engagement
sequence as it attempts to destroy enemy aircraft. The steps
of the sequence are:
1. Detection - The system/operator senses the presence
of an aircraft in the assigned airspace.
2. Track - The site tracking radars obtain radar lock on
the target
.
3. Fire - The site launches a missile attempting to
destroy the target.
4. Intercept - The missile arrives at a predicted point
in space. This point is assumed to be the location
of the collision of the missile and the target.
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5. Damage Assessment - The system/operator decides if
target destruction has been achieved.














Figure 5.1 The Engagement Sequence
If the target leaves radar surveillance (either acquisi-
tion or tracking), the sequence is terminated. When the
target returns to the site detection envelope, it is consid-
ered to be new acquisition. The time delays associated with
each step of the sequence are defined as follows:
Td = time between maximum possible detection and
actual detection.
Tt = time between actual detection and track.
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Tf = time between track and fire.
Ti = time between fire and intercept.
Ta = time between intercept and assessment of the
intercept
.
The proposed model design will explicitly model these
time delays. The time delays are generally a function of
four major factors:
1. Normal system/operator variability
2. Weather
3. Enemy ECM capability
4. Mode of Control
D. MODEL PRE-PROCESSING
Several pre-processing submodels will be used to make
the model design more efficient.
1 . Pre -Processing Inputs
The inputs required by the pre-processing submodels
are
a. Site location in term of its map grid coordinate,
X and Y.
b. Site altitude, s.
c. Acquisition/ tracking radar maximum slant range, R.
d. Target flight path description (see Appendix A):
1) Initial position and time of departure.
2) Heading, distance, speed, and altitude of
each flight segment.
This path description will'be used to generate a




a) X(t) and Y(t) are the target grid
coordinates at time step, t, and
b) a(t) is the target altitude at time
step, t.
e. Average altitude grid (see Appendix B)
.
This will be used to generate a minimum altitude
grid ( Appendix C)
.
f. Missile flight model.
This will be used to determine a predicted intercept
point when a missile is fired at the target.
2
. Pre -Processing Outputs
The objectives of pre-processing are to:
a. Generate a detection state vector for each site.
This state vector is used to determine if a
target is capable of detection during a time step.
b. Generate an intercept state vector for each site.
This state vector is used to determine if a
missile should be fired at a target during a time
step
.
c. Generate a priority state vector for each target.
This state vector determines whether the target
is in the attack or return portion of its flight
path during a time step.
These state vectors will become part of the input
for the simulation model design.
E. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL DESIGN
In this section we will discuss a general description of
the model design. A flow chart of the model is shown below.
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1INITIALIZATION
TIME STEP I =1, K



















Figure 5.2 Model Flow Chart.
1. Initialization
The model will be initialized with the following
inputs :
a. Detection, intercept, and prioritization state
matrices which describe the site's ability to detect
and intercept all targets during all time steps.
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b, Site File This file includes :
1) A time step scheduling matrix ;
2) A target prioritization waiting list
;
3) The detection, intercept, and prioritization
state vectors for the current time step ; and
4) Site operational data such as operational status
and maximum track capacity.
2. Read State Vectors
Every time step will require the loading of the
current detection, intercept, and prioritization state




The value of d (t) will be checked to see if the
j
site can detect target i in the current time step.
a. If d (t) = 0, no detection will be scheduled and all
i
future scheduling will be cancelled.
b. If d (t) = 1, the site will perform scheduled events.
i
4 Perform Events
If an event is scheduled, the event will generally
be performed. If the event calls for the site to fire, the
intercept state vector will be checked.
a. If I (t) = 0, the target is out of range.
i
b. If I (t) = 1, firing will be performed.
i
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Mode of control, site track capacity, and prioritization can




The performance of an event subsequently calls for
the scheduleing of the next event in the engagement
sequence. This scheduling is a function of the time delay
distributions. Details concerning the time delays are
discussed in Appendix H. The outcome of a previous event of
a previous event may also abort future scheduling.
6 Update State Vectors and Site Files
The scheduling of future events requires that the
time step scheduling matrix be updated. The outcomes of
events must also be reflected in the site files and states
vectors. For example, when a target is destroyed , the
elements pertaining to the target in the detection matrix
will be changed to zero for all future time steps. This




The major steps described in the previous section will
be performed for every site and every target during each
time step. In most cases, the calculations merely involve
determining whether the value of a variable is zero or one.
The looping can be performed very quickly and presents no
major processing problem. Scheduling events involves
changing the value of a cell in a scheduling matrix to some
integer value. In general, the bulk of the cumbersome
processing, terrain evaluation, radar line-of -sight determi-
nation, and intercept calculations have been performed in
the pre-processing stage.
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL DESIGN
1. Data Bases
The following section describes the description of
the data storage formats used in this model.
a. Detection and Intercept Matrices
site
A detection state matrix is established for each











| | 1 | 1 | | |
Figure 5.3 A Detection State Matrix For One Site
When state vectors are updated for a site during
time step three, row three is read into the site file. The
site has target two in its detection envelope during time
step three. Therefore the entry in element (3,2) of this
matrix has a value of one.
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The intercept state matrix is formatted in the
same manner.
b. Prioritization State Matrix
The prioritization state matrix is established
in the following format.
TARGETS
1 2 3 N
1
1 1 1 1 II
2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
K 3 | | | | ||
TIME 4 | | | | ||
STEPS .|||| II
• 1 1 1 1 II
. | | | | ||
• 1 1 1 1 IIK||I! II
Figure 5 .
4
The Prioritization State Matrix.
When a site has its prioritization vector
updated in time step two, row two is read into the site
file. In this case, all sites receive the same row. The
value of one in element (2,3) of the matrix indicates that
target three was attacking the defended area during time
step two.
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c. Tracking Status Vector
The tracking status vector is a single row
matrix which is read into the site file during each time
step. Its purpose is to control multiple tracking of
targets when the mode of control is centralized. The format
of the vector is as follows.
TARGETS
1 2 3 N
TRACKING STATUS | | 1 | 1 | | |0|
When the air defense sites are operating under a
centralized mode of control, the controller will allow a
target to be tracked by only one site. For example, when a
site achieves track on target one, the value in element 1
changes from one to zero. If another site attempts to track
the same target, the program will check element one. Since
the value is zero, no track will be allowed. A value of one
in element 3 indicates that no site is tracking target
three.
When the mode of control is autonomous, the
tracking status vector is ignored.
d. Site File
This file is also in matrix form. It has the
following format.
(1) Status - The row labeled status indicates
the operational status of the site. A value of one implies
that the site is operational. A value of zero indicates
















1 2 3 N
I. | 1 | 1 | ||
1 | | | ||
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 II
1 3 | | | ||
1 1 1 1 1 ||
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Figure 5.5 A Site File During Time Step Three.
(2) Track Capacity - This is the maximum number
of targets which the site can simultaneously track.
(3) Track Load - This is the number of targets
which the site is currently tracking.
2 . Performance and Scheduling of Events
The performance and scheduling of events described
in Section E is dependent upon several variables. This
section will present the factors which must be considered so




a. Detection - A target detection will be scheduled
when the value of the appropriate element in the detection
state vector is one. If the value changes to zero before the
detection can occur, the scheduling will be cancelled.
Moreover, this change of value will result in the scheduling
cancellation of any other event such as track or fire.
b. IFF - When IFF is performed, a positive response
will cause the site to cease acquisition. In this model, a
positive IFF response will cancel further scheduling. On
the other hand, a negative IFF response will usually cause
the program to schedule a track event. There are two excep-
tions to this sequence:
1) In the centralized mode, if the track state
vector indicates a value of one, track will not be sched-
uled. In the case, the target is already being tracked by
another site.
2) If the site has a track load equal to its
track capacity, then a track on the current target will not
be allowed.
Even though a track is not scheduled, the target is
entered on the site's waiting list for possible future
tracking.
c. Track - When track is performed, the site load
capacity value is increased by one. Furthermore, in the
centralized mode of control, the target's element in the
track state vector is changed from one to zero. Fire will be
scheduled upon the performance of track.
d. Fire - The fire event will be performed only when
the value of the appropriate element in the intercept state
vector has a value of one. If the value is zero, the target
is considered to have gone out of range. The site will drop
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this target from consideration. The site waiting list will
be searched to see if there is another target ready to be
tracked. The performance of the fire event triggers the
scheduling of intercept.
e. Intercept - When intercept is performed, the
assessment event is automatically scheduled.
f. Assessment - When assessment is performed, the
outcome is based upon the site system probability of kill.
If the target is destroyed, several file manipulations
occur.
1) The detection state element is changed to zero
for all future time steps and for all to engage an aircraft
which no longer exists.
2) The site decrements its track load capacity by
one
.
3) The site searches its waiting list for another
target which may have been previously acquired but not
tracked.
If the target is not destroyed and the detection
state vector still indicates a value of one, the site will
re-engage
.
In summary, it is possible to design file handling




This thesis has critiqued the air defense submodels in
VECTOR- 2 and CORDIVEM and provided a description of a
general approach to modeling air defense using an efficient
model design.
The critique of current models has emphasized the errors
which occur in the prediction of attrition rates when aggre-
gate methods are employed. Furthermore, the omission of
terrain, electronic warfare, and command and control factors
have been cited as major weaknesses. The proposed design has
incorporated higher resolution models of terrain, command
and control, target prioritization, and enemy ECM. These
models have been added without overburdening the air defense
simulation. Maximum use has been made of pre-processing and
off-line calculations.
The proposed .model design. offers a framework for future
model building. It emphasizes the structure necessary to
create realistic models of the air defense engagement
process. As mentioned in previous chapters, the aggregation
of many modeling factors is very difficult and can produce
misleading conclusions. The general trend has been towards
the building of more realistic attrition rate models using
efficient high resolution methods. These methods allow the
analyst to incorporate the effects of overlapping coverage,
multiple kills, and system malfunctions more accurately.
Furthermore, this approach gives decision makers a better
understanding of the air defense process.
The reader is invited to employ this general design
approach as an architecture for model construction. Each
model will, of necessity, be modified to suit particular
modeling objectives. However, the overall approach will




The simulation of aircraft movement can be performed in
several ways. It is possible to design the simulation so
that many of the detailed calculations can be accomplished
off-line. Such an approach could improve the resolution of
the VECTOR-2 and CORDIVEM air defense models with little
additional computational overhead.
Enemy aircraft flights can be planned to take advantage
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Figure A.l A Typical Flight Path,
A flight path can be described as fololows:
1. Start time and initial position; and
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2. Heading, distance, altitude, and speed for each leg
of the flight.
By using a broken segment flight model, enemy flight
plans can be prepared in any level of detail desired. These
flights will be much more realistic and will reflect the
type of tactics commonly employed by the enemy.
The description of the flight path can be transformed to
a different format which will facilitate radar line-of -sight
calculations. An off-line program can transform the broken
line segment format into a grid point and altitude descrip-
tion. For each time step of the simulation, the flight path
can be described using:
1. The coordinates x(t) and y(t), from the grid terrain
model discussed in Appendix B ; and
2. The altitude, a(t).
This transformed description will be used to perform the
calculations described in Appendices B through F.
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APPENDIX B
A DESCRIPTION OF A GENERAL TERRAIN MODEL
Several large scale combat simulations have employed
terrain models to perform mobility and line-of -sight calcu-
lations. The following model will be used as a basis for
evaluating terrain masking of enemy aircraft.
Assume that the entire battle area is divided into
rectangular grid spaces. Each grid space contains a block of
uniform height, h, which is the average altitude of all
terrain features in the grid square. Figure B.l, below,
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Figure B.l Average Altitude Grid
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The average altitude can be approximated in several
ways. One method is to determine the altitude of each grid
square corner and average these four measurements. More
sophisticated averaging techniques, such as sampling or
numerical integration, could also be employed. In any case,
the construction of the average altitude grid can be
performed to any desired degree of resolution in an off-line
program. Once completed, the grid could serve as a data base
for several subprograms in the entire combat simulation. It
is also possible that the average altitude data may be one
particular parameter in a more detailed terrain model
accessed in the simulation.
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APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTION OF A MINIMUM ALTITUDE GRID
This appendix will develop a method for calculating the
entries in a minimum altitude grid. This grid will be used












Figure C.l Average Altitude Grid
Consider the average altitude grid shown in Figure C.l,
above. The line-of -sight from Site .1 to the center of grid
square (2,3) will now be analyzed. A profile of this line-










Figure C.2 Profile of Average Altitude.
The profile can be adjusted for earth curvature, as shown in
Figure C.3, below.
Drawing a ray, AB , from Site 1 through the edge of the
first block illustrates the terrain masking that the first
grid square creates. Based on the first grid square
masking, the minimum altitude required for radar line-of-
sight to a target flying over grid square (2,3) is calcu-
lated as follows.
The polar equation of ray (A,C), assuming the origin is
at the center of the earth, is:
r sin(Q) = m r cos(G) + Re + s
where
,
m = the cartesian slope of the ray
s = average altitude of the grid square
where the site is located.
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Figure C.3 Profile of Average Altitude
Adjusted For Earth Curvature.
Let 11 be the lateral range from Site 1 to the edge of
the first block ( see Figure C.4 ). Let hi be the average
altitude of this block. Then the points A and B, expressed
in polar coordinates, (r, ), are:
A = ( Re + s, --- )
2
B = ( Re + h,
IT 11
The slope, m, can be expressed in terms of Re, s, hi,
follows. Letting
11 as
r = Re + hi and




(Re + hl) sin(— -
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Figure C.4 Calculating Minimum Altitude, Al.
and , m =
11
(Re+hl) cos( ) - Re - s
Re
(Re + hl) sin( )
Re •
(2)
Letting L = lateral range from Site 1 to the center of




Substituting the above point into equation (1), yields the
following expression for al, the minimum altitude:
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Re + s
a X = - Re
sinf ) - m cosf )
2 Re 2 Re
Using equation (2), a simplified expression for al is,
Re + s
a l = _ Re
11
(Re+hl) cos( ) -Re -s
L Re L




Thus, given Re , s ,hl, 11 , and L, the minimum altitude
required because of terrain masking by the first block can
be calculated. If hi is less than s, the slope of ray AC is
zero, and
Re + s




As one proceeds across along the line-of -sight path in
Figure C-l, four grid blocks are encountered. Therefore,
minimum altitude calculations would be performed four times.
These four altitudes, Al through A4 , are shown in Figure
C.5, below
The minimum altitude entry, a
,
23
for grid square (2,3) in relation to'Site 1, is
a = maximum ( al, a2 , a3 , a4 )
23
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Figure C.5 Minimum Altitudes Along The Line-Of -Sight
.
This procedure must be repeated for every grid square
located within radar coverage of Site 1. Then, the Site 1




One method of determining approximate radar line-of-
sight is to use the minimum altitude look-up- table developed
in Appendix C. Figure D.l, below, illustrates a minimum
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Figure D.l Minimum Altitude Grid For Site 1
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As an example, assume that an aircraft is flying over
grid square (4,7) at an altitude of 700 feet. Site 1 does
not have radar line-of -sight with this aircraft because its
altitude is less than 897 feet. This line-of -sight check
can be expedited by creating a look-up table for each site
in the air defense system. The look-up function is not time
consuming. Details of calculating the minimum altitude
entries for the table are discussed in Appendix C. These
calculations can be done off-line and input into the simula-
tion data base. The accuracy of the minimum altitudes can be
improved by refining the grid. Again, this additional reso-
lution does not greatly affect the main model calculations.
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APPENDIX E
DETERMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION
The procedure for deciding if a site can detect a given
target involves the following steps.
1. Using a minimum altitude look-up table, determine if
there is radar line-of -sight to the target. If line-of-
sight does not exist, no detection will occur.
2. If radar line-of -sight exists , calculate the slant range,
X, from the site to the target. If the slant range is
more than the maximum acquisition range, R, of the
radar, no detection will occur. If slant range is less
than or equal to the maximum acquisition range,
a detection is possible.
The calculation of the slant range can be performed as
follows.
Consider a target at time, t, with the following parame-
ters :
1. ( Xl(t),Yl(t)) is the target grid coordinate.
2. a(t) is the target altitude.
The lateral range, LI, of the target from the site at time t
is :
Ll(t) = / (Xl(t) - X0(t))
2
+ (Yl(t) - YO))
2
where, (XO, YO ) are the grid coordinates of the site
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Figure E.l The Calculation of The Slant Range.
The angle, (o( ), between rays OA and OB is Ll(t)/Re , meas
ured in radians (see Figure E.2) below.
The slant range, X, can be calculated from the Law of
Cosines
:
2 2 2 Ll(t)
X = (Re+s) + (Re+a(t)) - 2 (Re+s ) (Re+a(t ) ) cos( --)
Re
where, s = the altitude of the site.
2 2




If X < R , a detection is possible.
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Figure E.2 Computation of Angle
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APPENDIX F
CALCULATING THE SITE DETECTION STATE VECTOR
The purpose of this appendix is to develop an accurate
detection state vector using the models and methodology
contained in appendices A through E. This detection model
will be developed using off-line computations and will be an
input to the air define overflight model. The level of accu-
racy of the detection model can be determined by the user.
It is a function of the accuracies achieved in the :
1. Average altitude model
;
2. Minimum altitude model ; and
3. Aircraft movement model.
The detection state vector is defined as follows. For each
time step , t
,
D(t) = (d (t), d (t), d (t), .d (t))12 3 N
where, N = number of targets generated in the entire
simulation.
d (t) = 0, when the site cannot detect target i
i
d (t) = 1, when the site can detect target i
i
The possibility of detection is determined by using the
calculations developed in Appendix E. As previously stated,
this detection is only a function of detection geometry.
During each time step, the site checks the state of each
element of its detection vector. All targets having a value
of one can be considered for the engagement sequence. If the
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site has been engaging a target during previous time steps,
a change of detection state from one to zero will cause a
reaction. One approach is to instruct the site to drop the
target from consideration. A more realistic decision algo-
rithm could have the site drop a target after two or three
successive time steps have indicated a detection state of
zero. In many case, the detection vector can accurately
simulate a target entering or leaving the radar detection
envelope
.
In summary, each flight can be flown over its course in
an off-line processer. The detection state vector can be
calculated for each site and input to the simulation data
base. During the simulation, possible detection is deter-
mined by examining the elements of the state vector for the
time step in question.
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APPENDIX G
CALCULATING THE SITE INTERCEPT STATE VECTOR.
Using off-line processing described in Appendix F, a
site intercept state vector can be developed. The intercept
state vector is defined as follows. For a given site and
for each time step, t,
I(t) = ( i (t), i (t), i (t), .*(*))12 3 N
where
N = numtrer of targets generated in the entire
simulation.
i (t) = 0, implies that a missile fired at target j
j during this time step will have a predicted
intercept point beyond the range capability
of the missile system.
i (t) = 1, implies that a missile fired at target j
j during this time step will have a predicted
intercept point within the range capability
of the missile system.
Given an intercept state vector for each site, it is
possible to simulate a missile firing range check at the
time step in which firing has been scheduled. This range
check is nothing more than a zero or one value check during
the simulation.
The detailed calculations have been performed off line.
The accuracy of the predicted intercept point can be
improved subject to desires of the model builder. There are
several high resolution missile flight models which could be
used without overburdening the air defense simulation.
77
APPENDIX H
ACCOUNTING FOR SYSTEM/ OPERATOR PERFORMANCE TIME DELAYS
The dependence of the time delays on the four major
factors, discussed in Chapter 5, can be depicted as follows:
TABLE III













| Td Yes Yes Yes No |
| Tt Yes Yes Yes No |
| Tf Yes No Yes Yes |
1
Ti Yes No No No |
| Ta Yes No No No |
A. DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS
1 . Normal Variability
System and operator performance are not constants.
First, acquisition and tracking radars will not always
detect and track targets at maximum range. Radar components
may not be peaked. Furthermore, radar performance can be a
function of operator experience and skill. As a result, the




Missile flight characteristics also vary from target
to target. The time between fire and predicted intercept
can be modeled as a random variable. Deterministic flight
models can also be used. However, their results may have far




Heavy precipitation will degrade the performance of
most radars. One approach to accounting for the weather
factor is to have the user input a desired weather condi-
tion:
a. W = implies that weather is not a factor.
b. W = 1 implies that weather degrades radar perfor-
mance. As a result, time delays will be increased
when Td and Tt are calculated.
3. ECM
If the user desires to consider ECM capabilities,
the following inputs may be choseji:
a. ECM = implies no ECM.
b. ECM = 1 implies the enemy is using ECM and the
effect is noticeable but does not highly degrade
radar performance.
c. ECM = 2 implies the radar performance is signifi-
cantly degraded.
These ECM conditions are those used in current air defense
doctrine. If ECM = 1 or ECM = 2, the values of Td , Tt , and
Tf will increase.
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4 . Mode of Control
If the user inputs M = 0, this implies that the mode
of control is autonomous and there will be no expected
increase in Tf . When M = 1, the sites are operating under
centralized control and Tf will increase (see Appendix E).
The remainder of this appendix will describe an
approach to modeling the variability in these time delays. A
great deal of research and experimentation will be needed to
arrive at more precise distributions for these variables.
However, the model design will introduce a framework which
can be modified as the model builder desires. For demonstra-
tion purposes, the time delays will be modeled as uniform
distributions
.
B. DESCRIPTION OF TIME DELAY VARIABLES
1. Time Between Maximum Detection and Detection (Td)
Let Td be a uniform random variable defined over the
interval (0 ,b ) . The parameter, b, is a function of factors
which are inputs to the* overall simulation. Consider the
following situation :
a. Normal detection delays vary from zero to five
seconds
.
b. Inclement weather causes delays from zero to
seven seconds
.
c. ECM condition 1 generally accounts for delays
from zero to five seconds.
In this situation, the detection time delay could be
modeled as a uniform random variable on the interval
(0, 17). If the user decided to disregard the effects of
inclement weather and ECM, the distribution could be defined
over the interval (0, 5).
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2. Time Between Actual Detection and Tracking (Tt
)
Current air defense systems experience several
delays during this portion of the engagement sequence. In
many cases, a target will return a pulse which can be
detected. However, the target returns may not be steady or
strong enough for a tracking radar to obtain range gate
lock. The delays caused by variable system/operator
performance, weather, ECM are similar to those involving the
detection process. However, the time delays are often
greater in mean and variance.
A uniform distribution could be used to simulate the
value of Tt . The interval of definition would generally be
defined as (a, b). There is some lower bound for Tt . Under
best conditions, a can be no less than two seconds for
systems such as NIKE-HAWK.
3. Time Between Tracking and Firing (Tf
)
If the sites are operating under centralized control
(M=l), the expected value of Tf will increase (see Appendix
E) . Even when the autonomous mode is in effect, time delays
may be encountered because the target is out of missile
intercept range. It is possible to track a target and delay
firing until the target flies closer to the site. This delay
can best be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Under some weapons control conditions, the target
must be challenged using a Interrogation Friend or Foe (IFF)
system. The IFF check usually requires a fixed amount of
time. IFF considerations are addressed in Appendix H.
If the user plans to include IFF checks and operate
the air defense in a centralized mode, consideration must be
given to increasing the expected value of Tf. If a uniform
distribution is used, the interval of definition should
again be (a, b), where a is greater than zero.
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4. Time Between Firing and Predicted Missile Intercept
(Ti)
As mentioned earlier, missile flight models can be
used to calculate deterministic time delays. Ti can also be
modeled as a uniform random variable on the interval (a, b)
where a is the minimum flight time and b is the maximum
flight time. These parameters can be calculated using a
missile flight model. Missile flight times derive there
greatest variability based on the heading and speed of the
target. If the missile must intercept a high speed, outbound
target, the expected flight time will increase considerably.
5
.
Time Between Intercept and Completion of Damage
Assessment (Ta)
There is a time delay experienced when an intercept
is believed to have occurred. The operator must determine if
the target has been destroyed or if the missile has malfunc-
tioned. Operators rely on multiple indicators to confirm a
kill. Ta is usually the smallest of the time delays but
should be considered. If the target continues to fly, the
site must decide whether to refire or switch to another








Each air defense site is controlled by a higher
headquarters. The site may acquire and track targets as
as it deems appropriate. However, the decision to fire
is maintained at headquarters. Typically, this
headquarters is the Battalion Operations Central (BOC)
.
The BOC usually controls four firing sites.
Autonomous
:
The sites act independently and fire at targets
based on hostile criteria.
Centralized control allows for efficient fire distribu-
tion. However, it may not be responsive in high density
attacks. The autonomous mode allows for quick reaction, but
often results in overkill and improper fire distribution.
Air defense simulations can model a choice of mode of
control. One approach makes use of the files maintaining
status on each site and each target. These files were intro-
duced in Chapter 5
.
Consider the situation where the model user selects the
centralized mode of control. In each time step, the detec-
tion algorithm is performed by each site for each target in
the system. When a site detects a target it checks the
value of the track state vector. Two situations can occur:
1. If T = 1, T is changed to 0, and the site schedules a
track event at a later time step. It is the only site
allowed to engage the target.
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2. If T = 0, the site disregards the acquisition and
searches for another target.
If the site cannot engage the target successfully, it
changes the value of T back to one, so that other sites may
attempt to engage. This procedure allows for fire distribu-
tion which is realistic.
An additional factor to consider is the additional time
delay which may occur between tracking and firing on the
target. In the centralized mode, a firing unit must ask for
permission to fire after track has been achieved. This addi-
tional delay can be built into the time delay distributions
described in Appendix G.
In the case where the model user selects the autonomous
mode of control, multiple engagements are allowed. The value
of T will remain at one. This will allow multiple tracking
and firing against one target. Such actions are usual in
this mode and occur when sites have overlapping coverage.
In both modes, the site and target status files must be
updated to reflect a target kill. This will cause all units
to drop the target from their files and avoid multiple kills




. INTERROGATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF)
The air defense overflight attrition models in VECTOR-2
and CORDIVEM totally ignored IFF. The IFF process is impor-
tant for two reasons:
1. The IFF procedure requires some time to execute and may
delay firing.
2. The IFF check may be the only means by which the site
decides whether the target is friend or foe.
The IFF check may improperly classify a target. The
check can be modeled as a Bernoulli trial with conditional
probabilities defined as follows.
1. Let PI = probability that a friendly target is classified
as friendly.
2. Let P2 = probability that an enemy target is classify
as foe.
The user could input the IFF condition as follows:
1. Let IFF = if IFF is not in effect.
2. Let IFF = 1 if IFF is to be used.
Second, IFF is modeled, the conduct of the simulation
will reveal two significant results. First, the sites will
devote considerable time to acquiring and tracking friendly
aircraft. A positive IFF response will cause the site to
disregard the friendly target and search for new target.
This loss of time should markedly decrease attrition rate
predictions. Second, fratricide may still occur because of
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improper IFF responses. If IFF is not modeled the sites will
destroy friendly aircraft in greater numbers. Now fratricide
will be a significant factor.
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APPENDIX K
TARGET PRIORITIZATION AND SELECTION
In the air defense models used in VECTOR-2 and CORDIVEM,
target prioritization and selection algorithms were not
employed. One technique which can be implemented to simu-
late a selection process is to tag each target as either
attacking or returning to its own territory.
One method of tagging involves the development of a
prioritization state vector. This vector is defined as
follows. For a given site and time step, t,
P(t) = ( P
1




N = number of targets in the entire simulation.
p (t) = 1, when the target i is flying the attack
i
portion of its flight path.
p (t) = 0, when the target i is flying the return
i
portion of its flight path.
The prioritization state vector will be used to order
targets which are on the site waiting list (see Chapter V).
As discussed in appendices F and G, the priority values
can be determined in an off-line calculation. During the
actual air defense simulation, prioritization is merely a
zero or one value check.
As targets are acquired and tracked, the site files are
updated. When a site is tracking or attempting to. track its
maximum number of targets, all other acquisitions can be
entered on a site waiting list. V/hen the site drops one of
its primary targets, it can search the waiting list and
87
consider the "attack" or "return" status of the target as a
criterion for selection.
Other prioritization rules can be developed. However the
tagging, described above, agrees with air defense doctrine.
It appears that this form of prioritization can be imple-
mented with minor computational overhead.
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